History 0470 | Paper 2 Mock 01 | Document Questions
Question 1 Report
Study sources A and B in this question.
Source A
The following table shows the size of the Soviet armed forces and the number of countries under Soviet influence between 1945 and 1950.
From Western intelligence estimates, declassified in 1998.
How useful is this source as evidence that Soviet actions were responsible for the Cold War? Explain your answer using details of the source and your knowledge. [8]
This is a source utility question worth [8 marks]. You must evaluate what the source reveals about whether Soviet actions caused the Cold War, then identify its limitations.
Analysing the source content [up to 4 marks]:
The source presents two sets of data side by side: Soviet armed forces personnel and the number of Soviet-aligned states in Eastern Europe between 1945 and 1950.
- The number of Soviet-aligned states rose from zero in 1945 to seven by 1948 and eight by 1950. This rapid expansion of Soviet influence across Eastern Europe supports the view that Stalin was aggressively extending communist control, which alarmed the Western powers and helped cause the Cold War.
- The states brought under Soviet influence included Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, East Germany, and Albania. In each case, communist governments were installed through a combination of rigged elections, political intimidation, and the suppression of opposition parties.
- By 1950, Soviet forces had risen again to 5.8 million, coinciding with the outbreak of the Korean War, suggesting renewed military preparedness.
Evaluating limitations [up to 4 marks]:
- Provenance: The source comes from Western intelligence estimates, declassified in 1998. Western intelligence during the Cold War had a tendency to overestimate Soviet strength to justify Western military spending and alliance-building. The figures may not be entirely accurate.
- Alternative interpretation: The demobilisation from 11.4 million to 2.9 million between 1945 and 1948 actually suggests the Soviets were not preparing for war. This dramatic reduction is often overlooked but is significant evidence against the claim of Soviet aggression.
- Defensive framing: The creation of aligned states can be interpreted as defensive rather than aggressive. The Soviet Union had been invaded twice through Eastern Europe in the twentieth century (1914 and 1941) and suffered approximately 27 million deaths in the Second World War. Stalin's desire for a buffer zone can be understood as a security response rather than expansionism.
- Missing context: The source shows only Soviet actions and omits American actions during the same period, including the Truman Doctrine (1947), the Marshall Plan (1948), and the formation of NATO (1949), all of which the Soviet Union viewed as threatening encirclement. Without both sides, the source cannot prove who was responsible for the Cold War.
Exam technique: When data appears to support one interpretation clearly, always ask what alternative explanation the same data could support. Here, the same numbers that suggest Soviet aggression (more aligned states) also suggest restraint (massive demobilisation). The best answers explore both readings.
Answer Details
This is a source utility question worth [8 marks]. You must evaluate what the source reveals about whether Soviet actions caused the Cold War, then identify its limitations.
Analysing the source content [up to 4 marks]:
The source presents two sets of data side by side: Soviet armed forces personnel and the number of Soviet-aligned states in Eastern Europe between 1945 and 1950.
- The number of Soviet-aligned states rose from zero in 1945 to seven by 1948 and eight by 1950. This rapid expansion of Soviet influence across Eastern Europe supports the view that Stalin was aggressively extending communist control, which alarmed the Western powers and helped cause the Cold War.
- The states brought under Soviet influence included Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, East Germany, and Albania. In each case, communist governments were installed through a combination of rigged elections, political intimidation, and the suppression of opposition parties.
- By 1950, Soviet forces had risen again to 5.8 million, coinciding with the outbreak of the Korean War, suggesting renewed military preparedness.
Evaluating limitations [up to 4 marks]:
- Provenance: The source comes from Western intelligence estimates, declassified in 1998. Western intelligence during the Cold War had a tendency to overestimate Soviet strength to justify Western military spending and alliance-building. The figures may not be entirely accurate.
- Alternative interpretation: The demobilisation from 11.4 million to 2.9 million between 1945 and 1948 actually suggests the Soviets were not preparing for war. This dramatic reduction is often overlooked but is significant evidence against the claim of Soviet aggression.
- Defensive framing: The creation of aligned states can be interpreted as defensive rather than aggressive. The Soviet Union had been invaded twice through Eastern Europe in the twentieth century (1914 and 1941) and suffered approximately 27 million deaths in the Second World War. Stalin's desire for a buffer zone can be understood as a security response rather than expansionism.
- Missing context: The source shows only Soviet actions and omits American actions during the same period, including the Truman Doctrine (1947), the Marshall Plan (1948), and the formation of NATO (1949), all of which the Soviet Union viewed as threatening encirclement. Without both sides, the source cannot prove who was responsible for the Cold War.
Exam technique: When data appears to support one interpretation clearly, always ask what alternative explanation the same data could support. Here, the same numbers that suggest Soviet aggression (more aligned states) also suggest restraint (massive demobilisation). The best answers explore both readings.
Question 2 Report
Study this source.
Source A (your primary source for this question)
'The speed of our defeat was beyond anything we had imagined. On 10 May the Germans attacked through the Ardennes forest, which our generals had declared impassable for tanks. Within four days, Panzer divisions had crossed the River Meuse at Sedan. By 20 May they had reached the English Channel, cutting the Allied armies in two. The British evacuated 338,000 troops from Dunkirk, but they left behind all their heavy equipment. On 22 June, France signed an armistice in the same railway carriage where Germany had surrendered in 1918. It had taken Hitler just six weeks to achieve what the Kaiser's armies had failed to do in four years.'
From the diary of a French army officer, written in July 1940.
How useful is this source as evidence about why France was defeated in 1940? Explain your answer using the source and your knowledge. [8]
Understanding the question type: 'How useful is this source as evidence about...?' requires you to evaluate what the source tells us (its usefulness) and what it does not or cannot tell us (its limitations). You must consider the content, the author's perspective, and the circumstances in which the source was produced.
What the source tells us (usefulness): The source is a diary entry by a French army officer, written in July 1940, shortly after France's defeat. It provides specific, accurate details about the military campaign:
- The German attack through the Ardennes on 10 May, which French generals had declared 'impassable for tanks.'
- Panzer divisions crossing the River Meuse at Sedan within four days.
- German forces reaching the English Channel by 20 May, cutting Allied armies in two.
- The British evacuation of 338,000 troops from Dunkirk, leaving behind all heavy equipment.
- France signing the armistice on 22 June in the same railway carriage as the 1918 German surrender.
- The comparison with World War I: six weeks versus four years.
As a first-hand account from a French officer, the source gives an immediate, eyewitness perspective on the shock and speed of the defeat. The specific dates and figures (Sedan, 338,000 evacuated, six weeks) are historically accurate, adding factual weight. The diary format, written close to the events in July 1940, means it was not filtered for a public audience, potentially making it more candid than an official report.
Limitations of the source:
- Narrow perspective: As one French officer, the author experienced only a part of the campaign. His account does not represent the full picture of France's defeat.
- Focus on surprise and speed: The source emphasises the shock of the Ardennes attack and the pace of the Panzer advance, but does not analyse deeper causes. It does not mention the strategic decision to advance into Belgium (Plan D), which left the Ardennes sector weakly defended by second-rate divisions.
- Omission of air power: The source does not address the role of the Luftwaffe, which achieved air superiority early in the campaign. Stuka dive-bombers disrupted French communications and morale, and much of the French air force was destroyed on the ground.
- No mention of deeper factors: France's inter-war political divisions, low military spending during the 1930s, reliance on a defensive strategy built around the Maginot Line, and the failure to develop modern armoured doctrine all contributed to the defeat but are absent from this source.
- Emotional tone: Written in the immediate aftermath of a devastating defeat, the author's tone conveys shock and a sense of inevitability that may obscure the contingencies and mistakes that shaped the outcome.
Mark scheme breakdown:
- Level 1 [1-2 marks]: Simple comments about usefulness, such as 'It is useful because the person was there.'
- Level 2 [3-5 marks]: Evaluates usefulness with some support from source details. Identifies what the source reveals about the campaign (Ardennes, speed, Dunkirk) and possibly notes the author's position, but may not address limitations in depth.
- Level 3 [6-8 marks]: Evaluates both usefulness and limitations. Uses source details to explain what makes it valuable (first-hand account, accurate details, immediacy) and own knowledge to identify what is missing (Plan D, air power, deeper structural causes). Reaches a balanced judgement about the source's overall usefulness.
Exam tip: For 'how useful' questions, never conclude that a source is 'not useful.' Every source is useful for something. Instead, explain what it is useful for and then identify what it cannot tell us, using your own knowledge to fill the gaps.
Answer Details
Understanding the question type: 'How useful is this source as evidence about...?' requires you to evaluate what the source tells us (its usefulness) and what it does not or cannot tell us (its limitations). You must consider the content, the author's perspective, and the circumstances in which the source was produced.
What the source tells us (usefulness): The source is a diary entry by a French army officer, written in July 1940, shortly after France's defeat. It provides specific, accurate details about the military campaign:
- The German attack through the Ardennes on 10 May, which French generals had declared 'impassable for tanks.'
- Panzer divisions crossing the River Meuse at Sedan within four days.
- German forces reaching the English Channel by 20 May, cutting Allied armies in two.
- The British evacuation of 338,000 troops from Dunkirk, leaving behind all heavy equipment.
- France signing the armistice on 22 June in the same railway carriage as the 1918 German surrender.
- The comparison with World War I: six weeks versus four years.
As a first-hand account from a French officer, the source gives an immediate, eyewitness perspective on the shock and speed of the defeat. The specific dates and figures (Sedan, 338,000 evacuated, six weeks) are historically accurate, adding factual weight. The diary format, written close to the events in July 1940, means it was not filtered for a public audience, potentially making it more candid than an official report.
Limitations of the source:
- Narrow perspective: As one French officer, the author experienced only a part of the campaign. His account does not represent the full picture of France's defeat.
- Focus on surprise and speed: The source emphasises the shock of the Ardennes attack and the pace of the Panzer advance, but does not analyse deeper causes. It does not mention the strategic decision to advance into Belgium (Plan D), which left the Ardennes sector weakly defended by second-rate divisions.
- Omission of air power: The source does not address the role of the Luftwaffe, which achieved air superiority early in the campaign. Stuka dive-bombers disrupted French communications and morale, and much of the French air force was destroyed on the ground.
- No mention of deeper factors: France's inter-war political divisions, low military spending during the 1930s, reliance on a defensive strategy built around the Maginot Line, and the failure to develop modern armoured doctrine all contributed to the defeat but are absent from this source.
- Emotional tone: Written in the immediate aftermath of a devastating defeat, the author's tone conveys shock and a sense of inevitability that may obscure the contingencies and mistakes that shaped the outcome.
Mark scheme breakdown:
- Level 1 [1-2 marks]: Simple comments about usefulness, such as 'It is useful because the person was there.'
- Level 2 [3-5 marks]: Evaluates usefulness with some support from source details. Identifies what the source reveals about the campaign (Ardennes, speed, Dunkirk) and possibly notes the author's position, but may not address limitations in depth.
- Level 3 [6-8 marks]: Evaluates both usefulness and limitations. Uses source details to explain what makes it valuable (first-hand account, accurate details, immediacy) and own knowledge to identify what is missing (Plan D, air power, deeper structural causes). Reaches a balanced judgement about the source's overall usefulness.
Exam tip: For 'how useful' questions, never conclude that a source is 'not useful.' Every source is useful for something. Instead, explain what it is useful for and then identify what it cannot tell us, using your own knowledge to fill the gaps.
