How far was the Manchurian Crisis of 1931 responsible for destroying the credibility of the League of Nations? Explain your answer. [40]
This question asks you to evaluate the Manchurian Crisis as a cause of the League's loss of credibility. "How far" requires you to weigh this crisis against other factors that undermined the League, reaching a balanced judgement.
Arguments that the Manchurian Crisis destroyed the League's credibility:
- In September 1931, Japan used the Mukden Incident (an explosion on the South Manchuria Railway, almost certainly staged by Japanese officers) as a pretext to invade the Chinese province of Manchuria. This was a clear act of aggression by a major power and permanent Council member against a fellow League member.
- China appealed to the League, which responded by sending the Lytton Commission to investigate. The Commission did not report until October 1932, over a year after the invasion. By then, Japan had completed its conquest and established the puppet state of Manchukuo.
- The League Assembly adopted the Lytton Report in February 1933, condemning Japan's actions and recommending the restoration of Chinese sovereignty. Japan's response was simply to leave the League and keep Manchuria.
- The crisis demonstrated that the League could not prevent aggression by a major power. Its only tools were moral condemnation and economic sanctions, neither of which were applied effectively.
- Britain and France, the League's leading members, showed no willingness to confront Japan militarily in a distant region. Both were preoccupied with the economic depression and had their own imperial interests in Asia that discouraged confrontation.
- The crisis set a dangerous precedent: it showed that a determined aggressor could defy the League without serious consequences. This precedent was not lost on Mussolini when he planned the invasion of Abyssinia.
Arguments that other factors were equally or more damaging:
- The League had already shown weakness before Manchuria. The Corfu incident of 1923, when Italy defied the League without consequence, had exposed the same fundamental problem. The French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923 had bypassed the League entirely.
- The Abyssinian Crisis (1935-1936) was arguably more damaging because it involved a European power (Italy) committing aggression in a region much closer to Europe, where Britain and France had more direct interests and fewer excuses for inaction. The failure to impose effective sanctions (no oil embargo, the Suez Canal remained open) and the secret Hoare-Laval Pact (which offered Mussolini most of Abyssinia) made the League appear not merely weak but complicit in aggression.
- The absence of the United States from the League had always limited its authority and meant that economic sanctions could be circumvented through American trade.
- Structural weaknesses (unanimous voting, no armed forces, dependence on member states' goodwill) were built into the League from its creation, not caused by any single crisis.
- The global economic depression after 1929 weakened international cooperation and strengthened aggressive nationalism, creating conditions that would have tested any international organisation.
How this question is marked (Paper 4, 40 marks):
- Level 5 (33-40): Balanced argument assessing Manchuria's impact alongside other factors, with specific evidence and a sustained evaluative judgement about relative importance.
- Level 4 (25-32): Both the Manchurian Crisis and other factors discussed with detail; some evaluation.
- Level 3 (17-24): Detailed account of Manchuria but limited consideration of other factors, or vice versa.
- Level 2 (9-16): Some relevant knowledge but limited analysis.
- Level 1 (1-8): Vague or general statements.
Examination approach: The strongest answers will distinguish between damaging and destroying credibility. A strong conclusion might argue that the Manchurian Crisis significantly damaged the League's credibility by proving it could not restrain a major power, but that the final destruction of the League's authority was a cumulative process. The Abyssinian Crisis, occurring closer to Europe and involving a European aggressor, completed what Manchuria had begun. Each failure made the next one more likely and more damaging.